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[Please do not quote without the author’s permission]
The main aim of this paper is to disentangle three senses in which we can say that a model represents a system—denotation epistemic representation, and successful epistemic representation—and to individuate the problems that arise from each sense of the notion of representation as used in this context. Also, I argue that a model is an epistemic representation of a system only if a user adopts a general interpretation of the model in terms of a system. In the process, I hope to clarify where those who, following Craig Callander and Jonathan Cohen, claim that there is no special problem about scientific representation go wrong. In the terminology adopted here, even if scientific representation is only an instance of epistemic representation, scientific representation should not be confounded with denotation.
Introduction
Most philosophers of science now agree that one of the main functions of scientific models is to represent aspects or portions of the world. For one, R.I.G. Hughes claims ‘The characteristic—perhaps the only characteristics—that all theoretical models have in common is that they provide representations of parts of the world, or of the world as we describe it (Hughes 1997, p.S325)’. Rutherford’s model of the atom, which represents the atom, and the ideal pendulum model, which can be used to represent the tire swing hanging from a tree in the garden, are examples in case. However, there is still much disagreement as to what we mean when we say that a model represents a system. 
In this paper, I develop Mauricio Suárez’s distinction between representation and successful representation (cf. Suárez (2002) and (2004)) in order to disentangle various senses in which we can say that a model represents a system and to individuate the distinct problems that arise from each notion of representation. Also, I argue that a model is an epistemic representation of a system only if a user adopts a general interpretation of the model in terms of a system. In the process, I hope to clarify where those who, following Craig Callander and Jonathan Cohen, claim that there is no special problem of scientific representation go wrong. In the terminology adopted here, whereas scientific representation is not special in the sense that it is only an instance of epistemic representation, the problem of scientific representation should not be confounded with the problem of denotation.
Is There A Special Problem About Scientific Representation?
The first question that confronts us is whether or not there is any special problem about scientific representation. In other words, do we need a special account of how scientific models represent systems in the world or is the representational relation between models and systems just a case of the general relation of representation?
Craig Callander and Jonathan Cohen (2005) have recently argued that there is no special problem of scientific representation. According to them, there is a general strategy to reduce any derivative form of representation whether scientific or pictorial representation to a single fundamental form of representation (most likely, mental representation, which is the representational relation between mental states and what they represent). If successful, this strategy would reduce what would appear as a number of distinct, though interrelated, problems to a single fundamental problem, that of providing an account of mental representation.
Callander and Cohen’s claim is bold. They claim that there is a general strategy to entirely reduce the representational relations that hold between objects as diverse as photographs, paintings, sculptures, scale models, maps, and, last but not the least, scientific models and what each of these objects represent to the relation between certain mental states and what these mental states represent. If, once Callander and Cohen’s general strategy is applied to the case of scientific representation, we were to find out that there are no outstanding philosophical problems about how scientific models represent systems in the world, then we would have to agree that scientific representation does not rise any specific philosophical problem. So, let us examine this strategy.
According to Callander and Cohen, something or other, the vehicle of representation, represents something else, the target of representation, in virtue of the fact that the vehicle evokes in the mind of the audience a mental state with the appropriate content. Callander and Cohen claim that which mental state a vehicle evokes in an audience and, consequently, which target that vehicle represents for that audience is ultimately a matter of convention and stipulation. If the appropriate conventions are in place, anything can be used to represent anything else. For example, if we stipulate so, the saltshaker on the table can represent the state of Michigan for us. However, our stipulation is entirely conventional and, had we stipulated that my right hand represented Michigan instead, my right hand would represent Michigan.
If we are to follow Callander and Cohen, thus the prototype of (derivative) representation is the relation between referring expressions and their referents. In English, the word ‘cat’ is used to refer to cats and ‘dog’ to refer to dogs, but, except the for the semantic conventions of the English language, but, as linguists often point out, this choice is entirely arbitrary: there is no reason whatsoever why it should be so and not, say, the other way around.
If Callander and Cohen are right, then Rutherford’s model of the atom represents the atom ultimately on the basis of a convention. The model represents the atom for a certain audience because Rutherford has stipulated with his audience that the model represents the atom. However, he could as well have stipulated that a saltshaker or the ideal pendulum represented the atom.
To avoid the most implausible consequences of their claims, Callander and Cohen have to concede that, even if in principle it would have been possible for Rutherford to use anything to represent the atom, in practice some vehicles were more convenient than others. However, according to Callander and Cohen, this does not mean that, in principle, a saltshaker could have not been used to represent the atom as well. Whether this line of defence is convincing crucially depends on what ‘more convenient’ means in this context.
Obviously, it does not mean that for Rutherford it was easier to construct a model of the atom rather than choosing any object from his desk and stipulating that that object represented the atom, or to pick any other model available at the time, say, the ideal pendulum, and stipulate that that represented the atom. Had any of these objects been able to serve Rutherford’s purposes, it would have been certainly easier for Rutherford to use one of them rather than constructing a new model of the atom. Thus ‘more convenient’ does not mean easier.
The sense in which ‘more convenient’ has to be construed if it has to serve its scope clearly emerges from one of Callander and Cohen’s examples. If we want to show someone where a place is in Michigan, they claim, it will be more convenient to represent Michigan by an upturned right hand than by a saltshaker because ‘[…] the geometric similarity between the upturned human right hands and the geography of Michigan make the former a particularly useful way of representing relative locations in Michigan, and it would normally be foolish (but not impossible!) to use an upturned left hand for this purpose since a more easily interpreted representational vehicle is typically available’ (Callander and Cohen forthcoming, p.14).
However, by conceding this much, Callander and Cohen give away the game. In fact, as they admit in the above quotation, in this case as in many others, our choice of a vehicle is not merely conventional. A choice is entirely conventional only if there would have been no reason whatsoever to prefer any of the available alternatives. For example, the choice of the word ‘cat’ to designate cats and ‘dog’ to designate dogs or that of driving on the right-hand side of the road rather than on the left-hand side are conventional only insofar as there is no reason to prefer any other possible option. On the contrary, whenever we prefer one of the options over all the others, our choice is not conventional.​[1]​
In the above example, the choice among a map of Michigan, an upright right hand and a saltshaker to represent the state of Michigan is not conventional. Our preferences are clear: we would prefer a map over the hand and the hand over the saltshaker. To insist, like Callander and Cohen do, that any of these three objects would serve as a representation of the geography of Michigan equally well because, though foolish, it would not be impossible to choose the saltshaker would be analogous to maintaining that a house and a bag of peanuts have equal economic value because, though foolish, it would not be impossible to pay the same amount of money for a bag of peanut and for an house.
Although our preferences are entirely clear, the reasons that underlie them are not. Why is a saltshaker a less preferable candidate than an upturned right hand and an upturned right hand a less preferable candidate than a map? To answer this question adequately, I think, we need to introduce the notion of surrogative reasoning and distinguish three among the various senses in which we can say that something represents something else.
Surrogative Reasoning, Validity and Correctness
If the map of Michigan, an upright right hand and a saltshaker are not equally good candidates as representations of the state of Michigan in the above example, it is because we want to use them to perform a piece of surrogative reasoning about the geography of Michigan.
‘Surrogative reasoning’ is the expression introduced by Chris Swoyer (1991) to designate those cases in which someone uses one object, the vehicle of representation, to learn about some other object, the target of representation. A good example of a piece of surrogative reasoning is the case in which someone uses a map of the London Underground to find out how to get from one station on the London Underground network to another. The map and the network are clearly two distinct objects. One is a piece of glossy paper on which coloured lines and names are printed; the other is a intricate system of, among other things, tunnels, rails and platforms. By examining the map, however, one can learn a great deal about the network. For example, one can find which trains one can catch in order to reach one of the stations on the network from any other station on the network. We can thus say that the map allows its competent users to carry out a piece of surrogative reasoning about the network or, less awkwardly, that someone can perform surrogative inferences from the map to the network.
For our purposes, it is important to distinguish between valid and correct surrogative inferences. A surrogative inference is valid if and only if it is in accordance with a set of rules which interpret facts about the vehicle as facts about the target and it is correct if and only if it is valid and its conclusions are true of the target. In what follows I will call any such set of rules for a certain vehicle an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target and I will say that by adopting an interpretation of a vehicle the user interprets the vehicle. For example, the standard interpretation of the London Underground map includes the rule that a tiny black circle with a name printed on a side stands for an interchange station with that name and a dark blue line connecting any two black circles means that the Piccadilly line trains operate between the two stations denoted by the circles. Thus, the surrogative inference from the fact that, on the map, a light blue line connects the circles labelled ‘Holborn’ and ‘Finsbury Park’ to the fact that, on the network, Piccadilly line trains operate between Holborn and Finsbury Park stations is valid (according to the standard interpretation of the map). However, that inference is correct only if it is also true that Piccadilly line trains operate between those two stations.
For our purposes, it is useful to distinguish two subsets of rules within an interpretation: denotational rules and inferential rules. Denotational rules establish a correspondence between parts of the vehicle and parts of the target (e.g. ‘small black circles on the map denote interchange stations in the network’ and ‘a circle with a name printed on the side denotes the station with that name’). Inferential rules generally interpret some facts about the vehicle and its components as facts about, respectively, the target and the corresponding components.
Denotation and Epistemic Representation
One of the main problems with the notion of representation is that by ‘representation’ people often mean different things. For the present purposes, it is important to distinguish three senses of ‘representation’. In a first sense, both the logo of London Underground and a map of London Underground can be taken to represent the London Underground network. In the terminology I adopt here, we can say that they both denote the network.​[2]​ Denotation is mainly a matter of convention. In principle, anything can denote anything else if a group of users agrees that it does so.
The map of London Underground, however, does more than just denoting London Underground network; it represents the London Underground in a second, stronger sense: it represents the network for epistemic purposes (as opposed to, say, aesthetic ones). It is in virtue of the fact that the map of London Underground represents London Underground in this stronger sense that the map can be used to draw surrogative inferences about the network. The same does not apply to the London Underground logo. If one has to figure out how to go from Holborn to Finsbury Park by tube, they can use a map but not the logo. The logo does not allow us to infer much about the London Underground network (at most it can tell us something about the aesthetic taste of its management). In the terminology I shall use here, the map is an epistemic representation the network or, for short, it represents the network, while the logo does not.​[3]​
The map represents the network in this second sense only if the user adopts an interpretation of the map in terms of the network. It is only when a user, more or less consciously, adopts some interpretation or other of an object in terms of the target that that object becomes what I shall call here a representation of the target. Any valid surrogative inference from the vehicle to the target presupposes that some interpretation or other is implicitly or explicitly adopted. If this is correct, then those who like Steven French (2003) claim that representation is a relation which can hold between two objects independently of any user are wrong: an object becomes a representation of another for someone only when they adopt, explicitly or implicitly, an interpretation of that object in terms of the other.
Sometimes, users are not aware that they are adopting an interpretation; and, even when they are, they would rarely be able to spell out the rules they adopt. For example, people are not usually aware that they adopt an interpretation to perform inferences from a photograph to what the photograph depicts. They feel that they can just see in the photograph what the photograph depicts. This however does not mean that they do not in fact adopt some interpretation but only that they take it for granted to the point that their interpreting the photograph becomes transparent to them. It is only because we are so used to interpret photographs that we can believe that we can directly “see” things in what is actually a piece of emulsion paper with an enormous amount of tiny dots on it.
It is important to note that different representations of the same target may have different scope, if they allow their users to draw different sets of conclusions about the target. Consider, for example, a view of Venice and a map of Venice. Both represent the city of Venice (in the technical sense that from both we can draw conclusions about Venice), but they have significantly different scopes. From the view of Venice, for example we can conclusions about how certain buildings in Venice look that we cannot draw from the map. From the map, we can draw inferences about the topography of Venice that we cannot draw from the view. If two representations of the same object have completely different scopes, like the map of Venice and the view of Venice, they can be said to represent different aspects of the same target.
It is also important to note that two representations of the same target have the same scope if they represent exactly the same aspects of that target even if, from each of them, one draws different conclusions about some or all of those aspects. For example, if from two maps of Venice one can draw exactly the same conclusions about Venice except that, from one, it is valid to infer that there is a bridge over a certain canal and, from the other, that there is no bridge, the two maps have the same scope. They are both representations of the same aspects of Venice, but they offer conflicting representations of that specific aspect of Venice. Two representations of the same target conflict with each other (about a certain aspect) only if incompatible conclusions about that aspect of the target can be drawn from each of them.
If two representations have different scope but the set of conclusions that can be drawn from the one is a proper subset of the set of conclusions that can be drawn from the other, then the latter has a broader scope than the former. For example, of two maps of Venice, one can have broader scope than the other if the former is more detailed than the latter. We can also say that the more detailed one represents all aspects of Venice represented by the less detailed one, while the less detailed one represents only some aspects of Venice that are represented by the more detailed one.
In order to have representations with different scope, we do not necessarily need different vehicles. Under different interpretations, the same object may give raise to different representations of the same target with different scopes.
Successful Representation
Consider now an old 1930s map of London Underground and a new map of London Underground. Both represent the London Underground network in the sense that one can perform valid surrogative inference from either map to the network and both represent the same aspects of the network. But they offer conflicting representations of some of these aspects. For example, from the old map, one would infer that there is no direct train connection between Euston and Oxford Circus, while, from the new map, one would infer that Victoria Line trains operate between these two stations.
Whereas the surrogative inferences from the new map are all correct, some of the inferences from the old map to the network that are valid according to its standard interpretation will not be correct of the network as it is today because, in the meantime, the network has significantly changed. In this sense, only the new map of London Underground successfully represents today’s network, while the old map’s representation of it is not (completely) successful—it misrepresents some aspects of the network. (Obviously, the reverse is true of the London Underground network of the 1930s, which is successfully represented by the old map but not by the new map.) In general, a vehicle is a completely successful representation of a target or, for short, it represents a target successfully only if the vehicle represents the target and all the surrogative inferences that are valid according to our interpretation of the vehicle are correct. A vehicle misrepresents (an aspect of) a target if the vehicle represents that aspect of the target and some of the conclusions that can be validly drawn according to our interpretation of the vehicle are false of that aspect of the target. 
By adopting a non-standard interpretation, however, it is in principle possible for the old map to successfully represent today’s network. There are reinterpretations of the old map that allow as valid only correct surrogative inferences from the old map to today’s network. In reinterpreting the map, we trade off its representational scope off for its representational success. The old map successfully represents today’s network only if we eliminate or restrict the rules which lead to false conclusions about today’s network and this typically results in a reduction in scope. For example, according to the standard interpretive rules, if on the new map two stations are not connected by any line, then, in the network, there is no direct train service between the two stations. However, if, on the old map, two stations are not connected by any line, we should not conclude that in today’s network, there is no direct train service between the two stations. Some of the subway lines which operate in today’s network did not exist in the 1930s.
Since it is possible to draw some correct surrogative inferences from the old map to today’s network from it, the old map is a partially successful representation of it even if it is not a (completely) successful representation. Also, if someone infers from the map that Piccadilly line trains operate between Holborn and Finsbury Park, the old map is a specifically successful representation of today’s network as it allows us to draw a conclusion which is true of it.
Epistemic Representation; or the Map, the Hand and the Saltshaker
Once we distinguish the senses of ‘representation’ that I have respectively called denotation, epistemic representation, and successful epistemic representation, it becomes clear that there are at least three distinct notions that are to be accounted for. 
Whereas a map of Michigan, an upright right hand and a saltshaker can denote the state of Michigan equally well, they are clearly not equally good candidates to represent Michigan for our specific epistemic purposes and to represent it successfully. While, for any two objects, it is sufficient that we stipulate that one stands for the other in order for it to denote the other; if one has to be an epistemic representation of some specific aspect of the other, it is also necessary that we adopt an interpretation of the former in terms of the latter with the right scope. Moreover, if we want the one to be a specifically successful representation of the other, and it is also necessary that the interpretation we adopt only allows us to draw true conclusions about the aspects of the target in which we are interested.
The fact that we have clear preferences among a map of Michigan, an upright right hand and a saltshaker suggests that, given a certain target and certain purposes, it is easier to give a suitable interpretation of some objects than others. Our preference of the map over the saltshaker can be explained by the fact that, in the case of the map of Michigan, unlike in the case of the saltshaker, there is a ready-made interpretation of the map in terms of the geography of Michigan. This interpretation partly consists of general rules about how facts about geographic maps can be interpreted as facts about a geographic area. For example, the spatial relation of points on the map corresponds to the spatial relation of the point they denote. These general rules, which are mostly implicit and are usually learned by learning how to use maps, are usually complemented by a set of specific rules given explicitly to the user by the legend of the map. By using the map we can easily and accurately show someone where, say, Ann Arbor is because our interpretation of the map allows us to interpret a black dot with printed ‘Ann Arbour’ nearby as denoting the city of Ann Arbour. Thus, if I point to the dot labelled ‘Ann Arbor’ and the dot is a few inches on the left of the dot that denotes Detroit, on the basis of the standard interpretation of the map, you can infer that the city of Ann Arbor is a few miles east of the city of Detroit. You can also infer that Ann Arbor is not far from the border with Canada and that it is southwest of the state capital, Lansing. If the map represents successfully that aspect of the state of Michigan, all these conclusions will be true.
In the case of the upturned right hand, we do not seem to have any ready-made interpretation of upturned right hands in terms of the state of Michigan comparable to the one available in the case of the map. Nevertheless, if no map of Michigan is accessible, then, depending on our purposes and our and our audience’s knowledge of the geography of Michigan, we might be able to make-do with an upturned right hand more easily than with a saltshaker. This is because there seems to be something about an upturned right hand that makes it a better candidate than the saltshaker to represent the state of Michigan.
Callander and Cohen call this something the ‘geometrical structure [the hand] shares with the state of Michigan’’ (Callander and Cohen forthcoming, p.13) or ‘[…] the geometric similarity between the upturned human right hands and the geography of Michigan […]’ (Callander and Cohen forthcoming, p.14). Thus, contrary to what they seem to maintain, there is something very specific about a right hand that makes of it a better candidate for the representation of the geography of the state of Michigan than the saltshaker. It is the fact that, from a certain point of view, an upturned right hand happens to have a shape which is roughly similar to the shape of part of the state of Michigan as seen on a map.
It is in virtue of this accidental resemblance that those who are familiar with the shape of Michigan typically have no problems interpret the hand in terms of the state of Michigan. If one has some familiarity with maps of the state of Michigan,​[4]​ it is easy to establish the general denotational rule that points on the contour of the upturned right hand stand for points on the contour of the state of Michigan as typically represented on a map.​[5]​ This further suggests an intuitive way to put into a rough correspondence the surface outlined by the contour of the hand with part of the surface of the map of Michigan and interpret the hand in terms of the map of Michigan, which represents the state of Michigan.
If I point to a point on the palm of my upturned right hand right under the thumb, you can infer that Ann Arbor is in the southeast area of Michigan. If the hand represents successfully the state of Michigan (and if I have pointed the right spot), your inference will be true. However, there are not many other inferences that the hand allows unless your knowledge of the geography of Michigan allows you to supplement the basic interpretation of the hand.
The representation of the state of Michigan provided by the hand is thus mediated by the representation provided by the map. An upturned right hand, thanks to its shape, can act as a stand-in for (part of) the map of Michigan. However, it is very unlikely that someone who is unfamiliar with any map of Michigan will be able to interpret the hand directly as a representation of the state of Michigan. On the contrary, in order to be able to interpret the map of Michigan in terms of the state of Michigan, one does not need to be familiar with any other maps of Michigan. They only need to be familiar with the general interpretational rules which are associated with geographic maps (as opposed to city maps or subway maps). Moreover, the intuitive interpretation of the hand is parasitic on that of the map as it adapts to the case of the hand some of the general interpretive rules usually associated with maps (such as the rule, that the spatial relations among points on the hand are roughly similar to the spatial relationship among the locations of Michigan they denote). One of the reasons which underlie our preference of a map of Michigan over an upturned upright hand is that the interpretation of the map does not require as much knowledge of the target of the representation as the hand. It only requires knowledge of some of the general rules to interpret maps, which are also required by the interpretation of the hand.
Another reason to prefer a map over the hand is that the representation of the state of Michigan provided by the hand has much narrower scope than that typically provided by maps of Michigan. First of all, under the intuitive interpretation, the hand represents only the part of Michigan southwest of Lake Michigan. Moreover, the hand does not contain a great deal of information about the state of Michigan that is typically available on maps of Michigan and it is not even remotely as accurate as the maps. Physical maps and road maps of Michigan represent many aspects of Michigan that are not represented by the hand (under its intuitive interpretation). As we have seen in the example above, if someone pointed a place on a map of Michigan, I can typically draw a number of conclusions about that place from the map that I would not be able to draw from the hand.
The only way to broaden the scope of the representation is that the user supplements the rules on the basis of their previous knowledge of the geography of Michigan. For example, if the user is familiar with the geography of Michigan, they will know that the segment of the contour of the hand from the tip of the index to the tip of the thumb stands for the coast of Lake Huron and not for, say a stretch of border. However, there is nothing intrinsic to a hand that sets out those segments of its contour that stand for a stretch of coast from those that stand for a stretch of border. Thus, a user who is unfamiliar with the geography of Michigan cannot tell whether, say, Ann Arbor is closer to a coast or to a border. In this case we can say that the user projects their knowledge of the target on the vehicle. Therefore, the more the user knows about the geography of Michigan, the more they can project their knowledge of Michigan on the hand thus broadening its representational scope. However, the more the user knows about the geography of Michigan, the less they need a representation of it.
In the case of the saltshaker, the user needs to project on the vehicle even more knowledge about the target in order to interpret it in terms of the target. In order to turn the saltshaker into a representation of the state of Michigan with the same scope as the one provided by the intuitive interpretation of the hand, users to agree on an interpretation of the saltshaker in terms of the relevant aspects of the state of Michigan. One way to do this is to establish a rough correspondence between some of the points on the external surface of the saltshaker and points on the border, while making sure that the spatial relations among these points are similar to the spatial relationship among the points they denote. The problem is that nothing sets off a suitable set of points on the surface of the saltshaker from the other points on it. Thus, unlike in the case of the right hand, users will have to project their knowledge of the state of Michigan in order to be able to use it as a representation of it. This obviously requires even more familiarity with the shape of Michigan than the one required in the case of the hand.
We can thus venture to conjecture that there is a correlation between our preference of certain vehicles to represent a certain target and the amount of knowledge of the target a user needs to project on them in order to have a suitable interpretation of the vehicle. In the case of the map, we only need very general rules to extract the information about the target “contained” in the vehicle. In the case of the hand, less information is directly encoded in the vehicle and increasingly more needs to be contained in more and more specific and detailed interpretive rules. At the end of this spectrum, in the case of the saltshaker, the interpretive rules contain all the user needs to know about the target and the vehicle becomes in fact redundant. The more the user is able to interpret just any object in terms of the relevant aspect of the state of Michigan thanks to the projection of their knowledge of that aspect on the object in question, the less they seem to need a representation of that aspect of the state of Michigan. The bottom line is: if one knows the geography of Michigan so well that they can interpret a saltshaker as a representation of Michigan, they are likely to already know where Ann Arbour is and, even if they do not, one can simply tell them that it is 40 miles east of Detroit without using either a map or a saltshaker.
In general, we seem to prefer vehicles that “encode” the relevant information about the target in a way that the information can be extracted by means of general interpretive rules over vehicles that require the user to project on the vehicle their knowledge of the target. If the vehicle is to be used for surrogative reasoning about certain aspects of the target, its interpretation must require from the user only a minimal knowledge of those aspects of the target. Since the concept of general interpretive rules or, for short, a general interpretation of a vehicle has such a central role in my argument, I think it is worth to explain more clearly what I mean when I say that a general interpretation is necessary for genuine surrogative reasoning.
General Interpretation 
In the previous section I have talked about general interpretive rules without defining what general interpretive rules are. Since the notion of general interpretation plays an important role in distinguishing between genuine surrogative reasoning and what only has the appearance of surrogative reasoning, the notion of a general interpretation has to be characterised more precisely. This is what I intend to do in this section.
An interpretation is general if and only if it could be used to interpret two different vehicles, A and B, in terms of two different targets, respectively C and D, so that A would be a successful representation of C and an unsuccessful representation of D, and B would be a successful representation of D and an unsuccessful representation of C. For example, it would be possible to draw a map of Maine that, when interpreted on the basis of the same interpretation as that of the map of Michigan, it is a successful representation of the state of Maine. By the same token, it would be possible to draw a map of New York subway system that, when interpreted on the basis of the standard interpretation of the London Underground map, it would be a successful representation of the New York subway system.
Even in the case of the hand, if we are lucky enough we could find another object that when interpreted on the basis of the interpretation as the hand it could be used as a representation of some other geographical target (e.g. a high-heel boot can be interpreted as a representation of Italy).
Let me now illustrate how an idiosyncratic interpretation (i.e. an interpretation that fails to be general) is not sufficient for surrogative reasoning. Suppose that you want to use the full stop at the end of this sentence, which is just a spot of black ink on a piece of paper, as a representation of the London Underground network the same scope comparable as the London Underground map. One way to do this is to pick one true sentence about the full stop (say the fact that it is black) and all the statements about the London Underground network that can be inferred from the map (A, B, C, and so on) and create a set of inferential rules that includes ‘if the full stop is black than A’, ‘if the full stop is black than B’, ‘if the full stop is black than C’ etc. 
This interpretation of the black dot is clearly not a general interpretation—the same set of rules could not be used to turn any other object into a successful representation of, say, New York subway system. The set of rules is tailored to the London Underground network. Only to the London Underground network (or a system identical to the London Underground network in every aspect that is represented by the map) can be successfully represented through those rules.​[6]​
Whenever an interpretation is idiosyncratic, the rules are not used to extract from the vehicle information encoded in it; they contain the information. Thus, cases in which the interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target is idiosyncratic are not genuine cases of surrogative reasoning. The user learns about the target system by virtue of knowing the rules and not of investigating the vehicle.
Scientific Models as Generators of Hypotheses
How does all this relate to scientific representation? Scientific models, I claim, are epistemic representations of aspects of certain target systems (in the technical sense that one can perform surrogative inferences from scientific models to some systems in the world). A certain model represents a certain target primarily in the sense that a user can use the model to perform surrogative inferences from the model to the system. The model is essentially as a generator of hypotheses about the system it represents.
Rutherford’s model of the atom, for example, was originally proposed by Ernst Rutherford (1911) in order to account for the phenomenon now known as Rutherford scattering.​[7]​ In a series of experiments in 1909, Hans Geiger, one of Rutherford’s collaborators, and Ernest Marsden, one of Geiger’s students, found that, in passing through a foil of gold 0.00004 cm thick, one in 20,000 alpha-particles was scattered at an average angle of 90 (Geiger and Marsden 1909). The phenomenon could not be accounted for by what, at the time, was the main model of the atom: Thomson’s model of the atom, also informally known as the plum pudding model.​[8]​ In the plum pudding model, the negatively charged electrons are embedded in a sphere of uniform positive charge that takes up the whole volume of the atom, like raisins in a plum pudding. The positive charge and mass are uniformly distributed over the volume of the atom. If the golden foil in Rutherford’s experiment was made up of atoms like the ones in Thomson’s model, even if all of the approximately 400 atoms in the foil fortuitously happened to deflect an alpha-particle in the same direction, the particle would still be scattered at a very small angle. A simple calculation shows that, for each atom an alpha particle crosses, an alpha-particle would pick up a total sideways velocity of approximately 6750 metres per second—only a few ten-thousandths of the particle’s forward velocity, which is approximately 1.6 x 107 meters per second (see Fowlers 1997). From Thomson’s model of the atom or, more precisely, from a model of Rutherford’s experiment in which the atoms in the golden foil are represented as in Thomson’s model of the atom, we can infer that Rutherford scattering would never occur. However, since Geiger and Masden’s 1909 experiments show that the phenomenon actually occurs, Thomson’s model is an unsuccessful representation of the atom as it leads to a false conclusion about it.
As the example illustrates, it is a necessary (but not sufficient condition) for a model to explain a certain aspect of the behaviour of a system that, from the model, we can infer that, under the appropriate circumstances, the behaviour occurs. The practice of explaining a phenomenon by means of a model is thus intimately related to the model being a specifically successful representation of the system that gives rise to that phenomenon.
In Rutherford’s model, all the positive charge of the atom and almost all of its mass is concentrated in the nucleus, whose radius is one-hundredth of that of the atom, and the rest of the volume of the atom is empty except for the orbiting electrons. Since the total deflection of a positively charged particle by a sphere of positive charge increases as the inverse of the radius of the sphere, the encounter with one single nucleus can deflect an alpha-particle at an angle of 90. However, since most of the volume of the atom is empty except for the electrons and the mass of electrons is too little to scatter high-momentum alpha-particles, most alpha-particles will not be deflected at large angles. Unlike Thomson’s model of the atom, thus, Rutherford’s model meets the minimal requirement above—from the model we can correctly infer that Rutherford scattering will occur.
From the model, we can also infer that the scattering of one in 20,000 alpha-particles at large angles is caused by the electromagnetic repulsion exerted by the atomic nuclei on those alpha particles that go close enough to one of them. If this inference is correct, Rutherford’s model successfully represents this aspect of the behaviour of the atom and explains Rutherford scattering.
When we say that Thomson’s and Rutherford’s models of the atom represent the atom, we are not merely saying that they denote the atom, like the letter ‘H’ on the periodic table denotes the atom. Rather, we are saying that they are epistemic representations of the atom—in the sense, that both can be used by competent users to draw conclusions about certain aspects of the atom. 
As I have already mentioned, the representations provided by the two models are not equally successful. One of the conclusions about the atom that can be drawn from Thomson’s model of the atom (according to its standard interpretation) has been proven false by Geiger and Mersden’s experiments. According to its standard interpretation, Thomson’s model of the atom thus misrepresents that aspect of the atom and, as a consequence, it misrepresents the atom.
The Interpretation of Scientific Models
Even if nothing in principle would prevent us from using the letter ‘H’ as a vehicle of epistemic representation, we would have to devise an ad hoc interpretation of that letter in terms of the relevant aspects of the atom in order to have a representation with a scope similar to that provided by Thomson’s and Rutherford’s model. On the contrary, the two scientific models instead are, in first instance, interpreted on the basis of the same set of general rules.
Once a set of denotational rules for a specific model to a system is adopted, the unrestricted interpretation of the model usually includes the following general rules:
	A first order property of an object in the model (e.g. the position of an object in a system) is interpreted as being a property of the corresponding object in the system,
	A first order relation among objects in the model (e.g. the distance between two objects in the system) is interpreted as being a relation among the corresponding objects in the system,
	An higher order property of an object in the model (e.g., the velocity of an object as a property of its position, which is a first order property of that object) is interpreted as being an higher order property of the corresponding object in the system,
	An higher order relation among properties of objects in the model (e.g. the relation between the mass of an object and its capacity to attract another massive object at distance r) is interpreted as an higher order relation among the corresponding object in the system,
	Properties of any order of the model as a whole (e.g. the energy of the system) can be interpreted as being a property of the system as a whole.
	…

The problem with the unrestricted interpretation of models is that, when interpreted according to its rules, the overwhelming majority of scientific models misrepresent aspects of their target system. Two important sources of misrepresentation in unrestrictedly interpreted models are approximation and idealization. An aspect of a model is an idealization if, when interpreted according to the unrestricted interpretation, it leads to a conclusion about the corresponding aspect of the target system that is known to be false to the author of the model. An aspect of a model is an approximation, if, when interpreted according to the unrestricted interpretation, it leads to a quantitative conclusion about the corresponding aspect of the target system that the author of the model knows to only approximate the value in the system.
What is notable about both idealizations and approximations is that both the authors and the users of the model are usually aware that, unrestrictedly interpreted, idealized and approximate aspects of the model leads to conclusions about the system that re, strictly speaking, false. To avoid false conclusions that stem from idealization and approximations, the unrestricted interpretation can be supplemented by a set of rules that block or qualify inferences from, respectively, idealized or approximated aspects of the model. I will call this interpretation the standard interpretation of the model. The rules that make up the standard interpretation of a model are not necessarily specific to a specific model and may include general rules such as:
	An idealized property of an object in the model (e.g. the “frictionlessness” of a plane) cannot be interpreted as being a property of the corresponding object in the system,
	An approximated property of an object in the model (e.g. the 9.8 meters per square second gravitational acceleration of an object towards the surface of the Earth) is interpreted as a approximating a property of the corresponding object in the system.
Well-informed users of the model do not usually need to be told that certain aspects of the model are idealized or approximated: they already know that no plane is completely frictionless and that 9.8meters per square second is only an approximate value for the acceleration experienced by a real object in free fall towards the surface of the Earth. Generally, when it is not assumed that it is part of the general background knowledge of the user that a certain aspect of a model is an idealization or an approximation, users are explicitly told that when they are learning to use the model. For example, elementary physics textbooks usually highlight which aspects of the models they present are idealized and approximated. Thus, the standard interpretation can consist of only of general rules, if some aspects of the model are implicitly or explicitly marked as idealizations or approximations.
The Focussing of Scientific Models
Only a couple of years after Rutherford proposed his model of the atom, in 1913, Niels Bohr published a pioneering paper in two parts titled ‘On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules’ (Bohr 1913). Among other things, in the paper, Bohr pointed out that Rutherford’s model of the atom is highly unstable. According to classical electrodynamics, any accelerated charge radiates energy. Therefore, the orbiting electrons in Rutherford’s model would rapidly collapse into the nucleus. From the standard interpretation of Rutherford’s model one could draw the conclusions that atoms are much more short-lived than they actually are.
It is difficult to assess to which extent this result was novel to Rutherford. On the one hand, nothing in Rutherford’s 1911 article suggests that Rutherford knew that his model of the atom is extremely unstable. This hypothesis is also supported by the fact that, in a later paper, Rutherford credits Bohr with drawing attention on this point (Rutherford 1914, p.498). On the other hand, in the 1911 article, Rutherford claimed: ‘the question of the stability of the atom proposed need not be considered at this stage, for this will obviously depend upon the minute structure of the atom, and on the motion of the constituent charged parts’ (Rutherford 1911, p. 671). Drawing on results by Nagaoka, Rutherford suggests that the model is dynamically stable, but he is not committed to the belief that it is electro-dynamically stable.
In proposing a model of a certain system, scientists do not commit themselves to the model being a completely successful representation of the target system. It is only through an investigative process that our competence in using a certain model as a successful representation of the system increases. This process, which I will call the focussing of the interpretation of the model, consists in determining whether all the inferences that are valid according to the standard interpretation are correct. In some cases, some of the inferences that are valid may be found to be incorrect when that aspect of the system is empirically investigated (as in the case of Thomson’s model of the atom and Ruterford’s scattering). In other cases, inferences which are known to be incorrect may be shown to be valid when the model is theoretically investigated (as it is in the case of Bohr’s “discovery” of the instability of Rutherford’s model of the atom). 
The focussing process terminates only when the relevant scientific community reaches an interpretation of the model according to which the model is a completely successful representation of the system. I will call a restricted interpretation of the model any interpretation of the model from which only true conclusion about the system can be drawn. As our competence increases, a model that, under the standard interpretation, is an unsuccessful representation of a certain target may become a successful representation of the same target if a restricted interpretation is adopted.
As noted in the case of the reinterpretation of the old tube map, the transition from the standard to the restricted interpretation of a model generally involves a reduction of its representational scope. The Aristotelian model of the cosmos offers a remarkable example of the extent to which the representational scope of a model has to be sacrificed in favour of its representational success.
In the basic Aristotelian model, the universe is represented as a system of concentric spheres. The Earth lies at the centre of the sublunary region, which is the innermost sphere. Outside the sublunary region are the heavens: eight tightly fit spherical shells. The outermost spherical shell, the sphere of the fixed stars, hosts the stars. Each of the other spherical shell hosts one of the seven “planets,” which, in this model, include the Moon and the Sun. Each spherical shell rotates around its centre with uniform velocity.
In the course of the centuries, almost all the conclusions that can be drawn from the Aristotelean model of the cosmos in accordance to its standard interpretation turned out to be false. This first led to various reinterpretations and modifications of the model, which gave rise to the cluster of variations on the Aristotealen model usually referred to as the Ptolemaic model, and finally to the demise of geocentric models in favour of the heliocentric, Copernican models.
Even a representation as largely unsuccessful as the Aristotelean model, however, may be turned into a successful representation of the cosmos if radically reinterpreted. For example, by adopting a restricted interpretation, a competent user can use the Aristotelian model to correctly predict the apparent positions of the stars in the night sky. Testimony of this is the fact the star maps that are used by amateur astronomers are, in fact, based on a radically restricted interpretation of the Aristotelian model. Despite its general lack of success, there is at least one aspect of its target that the model can successfully represent.
The Retargeting of Scientific Models
Focusing is not the only type of reinterpretation to which models are subjected. Another type of reinterpretation is what I shall call here retargeting. Retargeting occurs whenever a model that was originally meant to represent a certain type of system is reinterpreted in a way so that it can be used to represent a different type of system by adopting a different set of denotational rules.
Suppose, for example, that we want to ensure that the rope from which the tire swing hangs will not break when a child is using the swing. In particular, we want to make sure that the tension of the rope when the swing is being used is not higher than when the swing is at rest. One way to do this is to use the ideal pendulum model. In the model, the most convenient frame of reference is one in which the y-axis is always parallel to the rope and the x-axis is parallel to the instantaneous velocity of the bob. Two forces act on the bob: the gravitational force, which pulls the bob downwards, and the tension of the rope, which pulls the bob in the direction of the rope. If  denotes the angle of displacement of the pendulum from its rest position, the gravitational force can be separated into an x-component, mg sin, and a y-component, mg cos. At every point, the y-component of the gravitational force outbalances the force of tension, which is thus equal to mg cos. The tension of the rope decreases with  and reaches its maximum when the bob is in the rest position. 
But how can this tell us anything about what happens to the tire swing? The standard interpretation of the ideal pendulum interprets the model in terms of a real world pendulum. The bob of the ideal pendulum denotes the bob of the pendulum in question, the rope of the ideal pendulum denotes the rope of the real pendulum and so on.
Before being able to use the ideal pendulum as an epistemic representation of the tire swing, we have to reinterpret it in terms of the swing. In this particular case, there is a very intuitive way to reinterpret the model, one which includes among the denotational rules that the bob of the pendulum denotes the system formed by the tire and the child who sits in it and that the rope of the ideal pendulum denotes the rope from which the tire hangs and so on. It is worth noting that another advantage stemming from the adoption a set of general inferential rules, such as the ones in §9, is that it makes retargeting much easier. To retarget a model, it is sufficient to adopt a suitable set of denotational rules.
Once the model is retargeted, its new interpretation may need to be focussed. Some of the conclusions that were true of its original target may not be true of its new target. What is peculiar about retargeting models, however, is that in many cases most of the conclusions that were true of the original target are true of the new target. It is overwhelmingly improbable that, once retargeted, the map of Michigan or the London Underground map would turn out to be successful representations of the state of Oregon or the New York City subway network.
Conclusions
In confounding the three senses of ‘representation’ that I have respectively called denotation, epistemic representation and successful epistemic representation, Callander and Cohen fail to appreciate all the facets of the problem of how models represent their target systems. If Callander and Cohen are to some extent right in claiming that there is no specific problem about scientific representation, they are wrong in identifying the reasons why there is no special problem of scientific representation. The reason is not that scientific representation is merely a case of what here I have called denotation. The reason is rather that scientific representation seems to be a case of epistemic representation. However, since no general account of epistemic representation is currently available, there seems to be a problem to be solved by a theory of scientific representation. The problem is to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific representation, which possibly are also necessary and sufficient conditions for epistemic representation in general. In the next chapter, I will propose an account of scientific representation and argue that there is a further problem about scientific representation—that of successful scientific representation.
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^1	  An analogous argument against symbolic theories of artistic representation has been offered by Dominic Lopes (1996). David Lewis’ classical philosophical analysis of convention can be found in (Lewis 1969)
^2	  It is important to note that I use ‘denotation’ merely as a convenient label for this sense of representation. I am not trying to provide an analysis of what philosophers usually mean by ‘denotation’.
^3	  It is important to note that I use ‘representation’ merely as convenient shorthand for epistemic representation. I am neither maintaining that this is the meaning of the word ‘representation’ as it is ordinarily used (for example, in ‘The fresco on the altar wall of the Sistine Chapel represents the Last Judgement’) nor that this is the most important of the three senses of representation among which I distinguish.
^4	  Incidentally, none can directly see the shape of Michigan; one can only see the shape of Michigan from a representation of it. This is one of those cases in which we are so used to think about an aspect of an object—in this case, the political geography of Michigan—through our representations of it that we are unable to clearly distinguish that aspect of the object from our representation of it. 
^5	  I say ‘typically’ because maps that use different projection techniques may represent the shape of the state of Michigan differently.
^6	  The fact that, according to the same interpretation, a different black object would be a successful representation of a system identical to the London Underground network in every aspect that is represented by the map does not make the interpretation general. In fact, according to the same interpretation, that different object would also be a successful representation of the London Underground network and, thus, the interpretation does not meet the condition for a general representation.
^7	  There are at least two predecessors to Rutherford’s model (cf. Rosenfeld 1963). The first  Rutherford was familiar with Nagaoka’s work to which he explicitly refer in his 1911 article.
^8	  Thomson’s model of the atom was originally proposed by Lord Kelvin and only later was developed by J.J. Thomson.
